Like people, companies tend not to make any substantive changes in behavior
until its almost too late. Resolutions easily made just as easily go by
the wayside. For most automakers, significant change occurs when they are on
a stretcher, and bleeding red ink. Despite chronic weakness, all available energy
is mustered to rally forward toward health with new, often daring, product the
likes of which never would have been approved for production before illness
arrived. Once healthy again, sclerosis sets in, and innovations are neglected.
An odd thing, really, considering that it is when the OEM is healthy that it
is better able to absorb the shocks and setbacks that often come with innovation.
In the 1950s and 1960s, General Motors was the strongest automaker in the world
and one unafraid of innovation. I can remember overhead cam inline sixes
at Pontiac, the rear-engine Corvair at Chevrolet, a turbocharged 3.5-liter aluminum
Jetfire V8 at Oldsmobile, large front-drive luxury coupes when everything
in the segment was rear-drive, and many other interesting production vehicles.
Each pushed the boundaries, expanded the knowledge of the corporation, and when
combined with GMs less adventurous offerings, overlapped the market in
a way that kept the company prepared for almost any eventuality. Had the process
continued, is there any doubt that it would have been GM, not Toyota, who would
have introduced a hybrid powertrain to the market?
Unfortunately, the shift toward ever -greater efficiency forced these projects
to go underground, then disappear. And, for a while, profits increased as complexity
decreased. Call it efficiencys perverse short-term side effect. But it
wasnt long before the competition started to chip away at segments where
the newly efficient GM was underrepresented, or absent. Toe holds were gained,
and soon the competition was carrying off customers. Thanks to its size, it
took a long time before GM was wheeled into the operating room, fighting for
its life.
Now back on the road to redemption, GM is expanding its offerings, but doing
so through the rebadging of other automakers wares. Unwilling to carry
the cost of developing a small, turbocharged engine mated to all-wheel-drive,
GM tapped Subaru to provide this technology to Saab, though Chevrolet or Pontiac
are in desperate need of a sport compact capable of reducing young buyers
fealty to Hondas Civic. Confident of the need to play in the entry-level
arena, it sells Suzukis and Daewoos as Chevrolets while moving its domestic
small car upmarket. The only thing missing is the internalization of the knowledge
needed to create these vehicles. And that lack of know-how could, in the end,
prove fatal. After all, though it may be efficient, no one ever got healthy
by having someone else exercise for them.
As health returns to the domestic automakers, Id like to see them resolve
to expand their lineups with niche vehicles and niche technology. Put a few
thousand diesels into the national fleet, and not just into SUVs. Offer an efficient
luxury V10 by adding cylinders (and cylinder deactivation technology) to the
best V8 they have. Adapt a small-to-medium front-drive platform to rear-drive,
and create a family of new vehicles nobody else has in their portfolio. And,
from all of this, learn to shuffle the building blocks in ways never imagined.
Like the proverbial apple a day, it will do more to save money and keep the
companies healthy than anything else they might possibly do.